In the world of free culture licences, copyleft describes licences that require derivative works to be distributed under the same licence (or, sometimes, a similar one that guarantees the same freedoms to the public).
But I noticed that, at least in the case of free software licences, copyleft licences tend to be longer and more complicated than some of the wonderfully brief so-called permissive licences. For example, the ISC licence consists of a copyright notice, a 34-word permission notice, and a 76-word disclaimer of warranties and liabilities (if I’ve counted correctly).
For comparison, I asked on a relevant mailing list several weeks ago what the shortest copyleft licence anyone knew of was. Continue reading A non-coercive copyleft licence
In my first article about funding public goods, I mentioned in passing the Wall Street performer protocol, which involves bonds that pay out when a certain public good is provided. In this article, instead of talking about them as bonds, I’m going to think of them as bets — bets on whether the public good will be provided.
But the curious thing is this: people who want to help fund the public good do so by betting that the good won’t be provided. How does that work? Continue reading Betting against public goods that you want
Public goods in economics are those things that are desirable, but neither rivalrous nor excludable. That is, one person’s enjoyment of the good doesn’t detract from anyone else’s enjoyment of it, and it’s impossible to prevent people who haven’t paid for it from enjoying it.
For the purposes of this article, the main example of public goods I’ll be referring to is that of free cultural works, such as open source software and public domain audiobooks.
Obviously, a lot of these public goods are being produced, sometimes for altruistic reasons, sometimes for fun, and sometimes because it makes economic sense for the producer of the good, even if no-one else who will enjoy the good contributes.
Now, there’s nothing wrong with altruism, but people can only afford a certain amount of it, so perhaps we could have even more public goods if we could figure out an efficient way of funding them. How well can we do? Continue reading Funding public goods